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Control: 13954
Rec'd: SEPTEMBER 22, 1958
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FROM: BONN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 679, SEPTEMBER 22, 5 PM

Ein: Rmr: Rmr: DM/fuk

BONN RELAYS FOR YOUR INFO FOLG MSG FM BERLIN DTD AUGUST 31, 1958.

SENT USCINCEUR REPEATED INFORMATION CINCUSAREUR AND AMEMBASSY BONN.

TLEF RPT TLEF UNNUMBERED.

TO CINCEUR FOR PALMER, AMEMBASSY BONN FOR BRUCE, SGD HODES FROM BERLIN, GERMANY.

THIS REPLIES YOUR MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD, SUBJECT: STEINSTUECKEN, DATED 25 AUGUST 1958.

1. APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS CITED NOW DIRECT THE CONDUCT OF SUCH UNILATERAL ACTION AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE U.S. POSITION IN BERLIN WITHOUT SPECIFICALLY REPEAT SPECIFICALLY CONSIDERING PROBLEMS INCIDENT TO EXCLAVES. ALL CITATIONS EMPHASIZE THAT APPROVAL FOR THE USE OF ARMED FORCES MUST EMANATE FROM THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. THE TIME REQUIRED TO OBTAIN THIS AUTHORITY AFTER AN ACT OF AGGRESSION WOULD PRECLUDE EFFECTIVE AND TIMELY REACTION ON THE PART OF THE U.S. IN STEINSTUECKEN.

2. IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN U.S. PRESTIGE AND TO PROVE TO THE GERMANS, BOTH IN BERLIN AND IN WEST GERMANY, THAT OUR PLEDGES WITH RESPECT TO THE SECURITY OF BERLIN ARE COMPLETELY VALID, FUTURE TRANSGRESSIONS WITH RESPECT TO STEINSTUECKEN SHOULD IN MY OPINION BE DEALT WITH RAPIDLY AND EFFECTIVELY. TO ACCOMPLISH THE ARREST OR EJECTION OF BORDER VIOLATORS IN STEINSTUECKEN, THE U.S. COMMANDER OF BERLIN (USCOB) MUST HAVE PRIOR AUTHORITY TO TAKE SUCH ACTION AS THE SITUATION WARRANTS AS SOON AS SUFFICIENT INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE UPON WHICH TO ACT. THE

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-2- 679, SEPTEMBER 22, 5 PM FROM BONN

TIME LOST IN SEEKING AUTHORITY FROM HIGH GOVERNMENTAL LEVEL WOULD ALLOW THE TRANSGRESSOR TO COMPLETE HIS ACTION AND COULD AGAIN RESULT IN SERIOUS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES.

3. USCOB IS PRESENTLY ATTEMPTING TO PLACE SEVERAL WEST GERMAN RETIRED POLICEMEN IN STEINSTUECKEN WITH COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT. THEREAFTER HE PLANS TO IMPLEMENT ANY USE OF FORCE INITIALLY BY MOVING RECONNAISSANCE PERSONNEL INTO STEINSTUECKEN BY HELICOPTER. IN THE EVENT THIS SMALL FORCE, ENVISIONED INITIALLY AS A SQUAD, IS UNABLE TO COPE WITH THE SITUATION, OR THE AIRCRAFT IS DISABLED BY ENEMY ACTION OR MECHANICAL FAILURE, USCOB MUST HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ORDER SUFFICIENT FORCE OVERLAND THROUGH EAST GERMAN TERRITORY TO ACCOMPLISH MISSION OR TO RECOVER AIRCRAFT, CREW AND PARTY.

4. REGARDING PARAGRAPH C, CITED MEMO, IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT EAST GERMAN FORCES MAY AGAIN ENTER STEINSTUECKEN IN PURSUIT OF A REFUGEE AND WITHDRAW BEFORE U.S. FORCES CAN PROVIDE AID. HOWEVER, IF NO IMMEDIATE EFFORT IS MADE TO LOCATE AND EJECT THE INVADERS, THE U.S. POLITICAL POSITION MAY BE UNDERMINED BEYOND REPAIR.

5. THE STATIONING OF U.S. FORCES IN STEINSTUECKEN, AT THIS TIME, IS NOT RPT NOT BELIEVED DESIRABLE FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

A. RIGHT OF ENTRY INTO STEINSTUECKEN SHOULD NOT BE TESTED PRIOR TO ANOTHER INCIDENT AS IT WOULD SHOW OUR HAND AND PROVIDE THE OPPOSITION WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO REACT.

B. SUCH A GARRISON WOULD PRESENT A CONTINUOUS LOGISTICAL AS WELL AS A POLITICAL PROBLEM;

C. THEN SOVIETS AND/OR EAST GERMANS SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY FOR UNPREDICTABLE COUNTER MEASURES.

BRUCE

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